The Psychology of Epistemic Irrationality: Dual-Process Theory

Abstract

This theoretical review examines the foundations of epistemic irrationality through three interrelated conceptual frameworks: (1) the Dual-Process Theory, which distinguishes between fast/intuitive processing (Type 1) and slow/analytical processing (Type 2); (2) metacognitive intuitions, particularly the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which determine when Type 2 processing is activated; and (3) the Tripartite Model of Mind, which integrates autonomous (implicit processing), algorithmic (cognitive capacity), and reflective (epistemic dispositions) components. The analysis identifies two categories of key factors in epistemic irrationality: stimulators (cognitive biases, pseudoscientific beliefs, hostile environments, and contaminated mindware) and inhibitors (critical thinking, intellectual humility, metacognitive skills, and scientific knowledge). It highlights how the interaction between these elements explains phenomena such as the persistence of unfounded beliefs and the rejection of scientific evidence. The review emphasizes the mediating role of education in developing skills to monitor metacognitive intuitions and regulate cognitive processing, proposing that the balance between automatic and reflective systems, along with the cultivation of virtuous epistemic dispositions, forms the basis for adaptive rationality in complex and cognitively hostile contexts.