La Psicología de la Irracionalidad Epistémica: La Teoría de los Dos Procesos
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.68038/txdpas06Palabras clave:
Teoría de los dos procesos, sensación de certeza, mindware contaminado, racionalidad epistémica, formación epistémicaResumen
Esta revisión teórica analiza los fundamentos de la irracionalidad epistémica mediante tres marcos conceptuales interrelacionados: (1) la Teoría de los Dos Procesos, que distingue entre procesamiento rápido/intuitivo (Tipo 1) y lento/analítico (Tipo 2); (2) las intuiciones metacognitivas, particularmente la Sensación de Certeza (FOR), que determinan cuándo se activa el procesamiento Tipo 2; y (3) el Modelo Tripartito de la Mente, que integra los componentes autónomo (procesamiento implícito), algorítmico (capacidad cognitiva) y reflexivo (disposiciones epistémicas). El análisis identifica dos categorías de factores clave en la irracionalidad epistémica: los estimuladores (sesgos cognitivos, creencias pseudocientíficas, entornos hostiles y mindware contaminado) y los inhibidores (pensamiento crítico, humildad intelectual, habilidades metacognitivas y conocimiento científico). Se destaca cómo la interacción entre estos elementos explica fenómenos como la persistencia de creencias infundadas y el rechazo a evidencias científicas. La revisión enfatiza el papel mediador de la educación en el desarrollo de habilidades para monitorear intuiciones metacognitivas y regular el procesamiento cognitivo, proponiendo que el equilibrio entre sistemas automáticos y reflexivos, junto con el cultivo de disposiciones epistémicas virtuosas, constituye la base para una racionalidad adaptativa en contextos complejos y cognitivamente hostiles.
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