Between the ballot box and the robe: judicial reform in Mexico and its consequences for democracy

Abstract

The 2024 Mexican judicial reform, approved under the argument of democratizing justice through the popular election of judges, has triggered one of the most profound constitutional debates in the country’s contemporary history. This study examines its impact on democracy, judicial independence, and the institutional stability of the Mexican State. Based on a doctrinal and comparative review, it demonstrates that the reform, far from strengthening citizen participation, constitutes a setback in terms of the separation of powers and the protection of fundamental rights, thereby eroding Mexican democracy. It is argued that the popular election of judges distorts the counter-majoritarian principle of constitutional justice and opens the door to the political, economic, and criminal capture of judicial bodies. Likewise, the operational crisis of the Federal Judiciary during and after the institutional transition is analyzed, highlighting the risks it poses to the rule of law. The article concludes that judicial independence is not a corporate privilege but a structural requirement for the validity of constitutional democracy.