The popular election of judges in Mexico: an analysis from a comparative perspective
Keywords:
Judicial election, Popular vote, Comparative perspective, Judicial elections in MexicoAbstract
The text analyzes the popular election of judges in Mexico following the 2024 judicial reform, situating it within the debate on judicial independence and democratic legitimacy. It reviews comparative experiences: in the United States, where the vote introduces accountability but also politicization and financial dependence; in Bolivia, where the judicialization of the vote led to illegitimacy and subordination to political power; and in Europe, where judicial councils reinforce professionalization and depoliticization. The paper argues that judicial independence is a guarantee for citizens, not a privilege for judges, and that popular election can lead to judicial populism, undermining impartiality and public trust. In Mexico, the reform runs the risk of replicating negative dynamics if electoral logic is prioritized over judicial careers. The conclusion is clear: true democratization requires an independent, professional, and meritocratic judiciary capable of protecting rights against temporary majorities and political pressures.
Downloads
References
Ackerman, Bruce (1991): We the People: Foundations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Bonneau, Chris W. y Hall, Melinda Gann (2009): In Defense of Judicial Elections, Routledge, Nueva York.
Bright, Stephen B. (2002): “Political attacks on the judiciary: Can justice be done amid efforts to intimidate and remove judges from office for unpopular decisions?”, en University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 153, núm. 5, 151-206.
Cappelletti, Mauro (1989): Giudici legislatori?, Giuffrè Editore, Milán.
Chemerinsky, Erwin (2014): Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 5a ed., Wolters Kluwer, Nueva York.
Ferrajoli, Luigi (2001): Derecho y razón: Teoría del garantismo penal, 5.ª ed., Trotta, Madrid.
Ferrajoli, Luigi (2011): Principia iuris. Teoría del derecho y de la democracia, vol. II, Trotta, Madrid.
Ferrajoli, Luigi (2016): La democracia a través de los derechos: El constitucionalismo garantista como modelo teórico y como proyecto político, Trotta, Madrid.
Fix-Fierro, Héctor y López-Ayllón, Sergio (2006): Deficiencias y desafíos de la carrera judicial en México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México.
Garoupa, Nuno y Ginsburg, Tom (2009): “Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence”, en American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 57, núm. 1, 103–134.
Geyh, Charles G. (2003): “Why judicial elections stink”, en Ohio State Law Journal, vol. 64, núm. 1, 43–79.
Hamilton, Alexander; Madison, James y Jay, John (1788): El Federalista, Nueva York.
Kritzer, Herbert M. (2015): Justices on the Ballot: Continuity and Change in State Supreme Court Elections, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Mayorga, Fernando (2018): “La elección judicial en Bolivia: Entre la promesa democrática y la crisis de legitimidad”, en Independencia judicial en América Latina, Pásara, Javier (ed.), Fundación para el Debido Proceso, Lima, 115-138.
México Evalúa (2025): Reforma judicial en México: balance y perspectivas, México Evalúa, Centro de Análisis de Políticas Públicas, México.
Montesquieu (1748): El espíritu de las leyes, París.
Pásara, Javier (2014): Independencia judicial en América Latina: De la retórica a la realidad, Fundación para el Debido Proceso, Lima.
Sagüés, Néstor Pedro (2002): Derecho procesal constitucional: Recurso extraordinario y juicio de amparo, 2.ª ed., Astrea, Buenos Aires.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 RRevista Internacional y Comparada de Derechos Humanos
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
This means that anyone may read, download, copy, distribute, print, link to, and reuse the content, provided that proper credit is given to the authors and the journal.
