A Politicized Judicial Administration? The Composition and Functioning of the Judicial Administration Body

Abstract

This article examines the composition and operation of the Judicial Administration Body of the Federal Judiciary, as established by the 2024 constitutional reform of the judiciary. Specifically, the study seeks to determine whether the formula for appointing the members of the Judicial Administration Body is subject to political influence and whether such influence may affect the management of resources and the governance of the judicial career system. The members of this Body must be appointed as follows: one by the President of the Republic, one by the Senate of the Republic, and three by the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. These authorities, in turn, hold elective offices that derive from popular will, and political considerations are inherent in their selection. Consequently, the article concludes that the appointment of the members of the Judicial Administration Body may carry a political orientation, which poses a risk to the administration of financial resources, assets, and personnel, as such management could be conducted with favoritism and without adherence to objectivity, impartiality, and administrative neutrality.